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Abstract 
We analyse the motives and market valuation of various forms of stock market delisting. We 
show that firms that delist voluntarily are likely to have come to the market to rebalance their 
leverage rather than to finance their growth opportunities. During their public life, their 
leverage remained very high, they could not raise equity capital, and their profitability, 
growth opportunities, and trading volume declined substantially. Their stock prices decrease 
significantly on and before the announcement date. These results hold even after controlling 
for agency, asymmetric information, and liquidity effects, and suggest that firms delist 
voluntarily when they fail to benefit from listing.  
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Why Do Companies Delist Voluntarily from the Stock Market? 
1. Introduction 
Over the last few years, an increasing number of quoted firms delist from the 
London’s Alternative Investment Market (AIM). The most common method, accounting for 
nearly half of the delisted firms from AIM, is “at the request of the company”, referred to 
thereafter as voluntary delisting,1 where firms notify the London Stock Exchange to cancel 
their trading on the exchange at least 20 days before the actual event, get an approval from no 
less than 75% of shareholders at a general meeting, and then become private. Their existing 
shareholders have two options: either sell their shares before the delisting date or remain 
shareholders in what will become a privately owned company. Unlike other forms of 
delisting, such as transfer to the more regulated Main market, breach of regulation, takeovers 
or going private through buyouts, shareholders can still keep their old shares. However, in 
contrast to US firms that deregister with the SEC to become “dark companies” with their 
shares traded over-the-counter (OTC) on the Pink Sheets (Marosi and Massoud, 2007 and 
Leuz et al., 2008), in the UK, the delisted firms’ shares remain private and illiquid.  
The reasons and consequences of such delisting decision remain an open question. In 
this paper, we contrast the different methods of delisting, focussing particularly on 
voluntarily delisting. We assess whether firms trade off the costs and benefits of being listed 
in the stock market when they decide to delist as shown by Maupin et al. (1984), Kaplan 
                                                 
1 The Financial Times dated April 28, 2011 reports that “the first quarter saw 30 delistings, down from 51 in the 
first quarter of 2010. But news emerged ahead of the Easter break of two more companies asking shareholders 
for permission to leave. Both have been on AIM for several years….” The number of listed firms on AIM 
reached a peak of 1,694 in 2007, including 394 international companies, but in February 2012 there are only 
1,122 split into 897 domestic and 225 foreign firms. The total market valuation also decreased over the same 
period from £98bn to £71bn. 
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(1991) and Bharath and Dittmar (2010) in the case of going private. We test the hypothesis 
that firms delist voluntarily because they are unable to obtain funding from AIM to rebalance 
their capital structure, even though this factor is one of the major motivations for IPOs (e.g., 
Aslan and Kumar, 2011; Bharath and Dittmar, 2010; Kim and Weisbach, 2005; Marosi and 
Massoud, 2007). We also use hand-collected data from prospectuses to assess the reasons for 
listing and whether the delisting decision can be predicted at the IPO date, and stock price 
data to evaluate whether such a decision creates or destroys shareholder value. 
We find that voluntarily delisted firms are significantly different from size and IPO-
date control firms, and from firms that delist to transfer to the Main market, or because of 
takeovers or breach of legislation. We show that voluntary delisting, like delisting because of 
breach of regulation, is more likely to occur about 4 years after the IPO date, compared to the 
2 years for IPOs that transfer to Main market and takeovers. At the IPO date, voluntary 
delisted firms and those that delisted because of regulation have significantly higher leverage 
than their control groups, in contrast to those that delist to transfer to the Main market or 
through takeovers, but the other IPO fundamental characteristics, including first day return 
and venture capital backing, cannot predict any of the delisting methods. However, when we 
measure our variables over the quotation period, or one year before the delisting date, we find 
that voluntary delisted firms remain highly leveraged, with low growth opportunities and 
profitability, and generate significantly lower returns than the control firms, in contrast to 
firms that transfer to the Main market which have significantly higher excess returns and 
lower beta. The voluntary delisted firms and those that delisted because of regulation are also 
less likely to have raised equity capital or to be from high tech sector. Thus, in line with the 
market access hypothesis, voluntary delisted firms are likely to have come to the market to 
rebalance their capital structure, but during their public life, they failed to raise additional 
capital and to create growth options, and their insider ownership remained significantly high. 
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Interestingly, these firms are not likely to have lower liquidity and financial visibility, as 
measured by stock turnover, trading volume and stock volatility, than the control firms and 
firms that transfer to the Main market.  
We find similar results when we follow our firms throughout their listing period. We 
show that during the first two years of listing, leverage of delisted firms increased, but their 
profitability and equity market value decreased, while their market to book, used as a proxy 
for growth opportunities, remained relatively constant. These results are in contrast to firms 
that transferred to the Main market which continue to exhibit lower leverage but higher 
growth opportunities, profitability and market value of equity. We also compare changes in 
these characteristics between the IPO and delisting year. We find significant increase in 
leverage and a decrease in firm value and trading volume. Interestingly, insider ownership 
increased from 44 to 56%, suggesting that the owners wanted to maintain significant control 
and probably not to keep their firm public indefinitely. In contrast, insider ownership of firms 
that transfer to the Main market declined from 20 to 12% and their equity market value, 
trading volume and stock turnover, increased significantly over the two periods.  
We test for robustness by using the Cox proportional hazard model to investigate the 
determinants of the delisting decision given changes that happen to the firms’ characteristics 
over time. We find that leverage and growth opportunities, as measured by market-to-book 
ratio or capital expenditure, and the lack of seasoned equity offerings explain significantly the 
decision to delist voluntarily. The results of hazard rates, used to assess how much the hazard 
of the delisting event increases for a unit change in the explanatory variable, show that the 
marginal effect of leverage is the most important factor. Our results imply that firms that do 
not raise equity capital, as they have high debt and low growth opportunities and capital 
expenditure, are more likely to choose to delist voluntarily. Unlike going private through 
buyouts where firms have high free cash flow (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989), and in contrast to 
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Pagano et al. (1998), Brav (2009) and Aslan and Kumar (2011), we show that firms delist 
when they are not able to reduce their leverage mainly because they are not able to raise 
additional equity capital during their public life. In contrast, firms that transfer to the Main 
market have good investment opportunities, are able to raise additional equity capital when 
they are quoted on AIM, and they are more likely to transfer to a bigger market to increase 
their funding potentials. Overall, these results suggest that the lack of financing opportunities 
is likely to motivate managers to delist voluntary from the stock market. 
Finally, we investigate the market reaction to the delisting announcement. Using the 
standard event study methodology, we find that, over one year pre-event period, voluntary 
delisted firms, like firms that delist because of breach of regulation, generate significant 
negative returns of about 2%, compared to +14% for firms that transfer to the Main market. 
On the event period [-5, +5] their excess returns are -10%, in line with the -9% and -12% 
reported by Leuz et al. (2008) and Marosi and Massoud (2007), respectively, but we 
contribute to this literature by showing that over-levered firms generate significantly lower 
returns on the announcement date, suggesting that the market reaction depends on the 
severity of leverage, i.e., the inability of firms to raise equity capital. In contrast, firms that 
transfer to the Main market generate strong positive excess returns, but, unlike Jenkinson and 
Ramadorai (2008), these excess returns are limited to the pre-event period. Firms that delist 
through takeovers generate negative returns of about 20% over [-20, +20] period. These 
results suggest that, unlike Gerakos et al. (2011), not all firms quoted on AIM underperform. 
Some that do, find it more appropriate to delist, but others use AIM quotation as a backdoor 
to enter the Main market, when they prove that they can perform well and they can comply 
with its requirements, implying that AIM does not cater for IPOs that need more funding to 
finance their high growth prospects and those that came to rebalance their balance sheet.  
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We expand previous evidence in several ways. Croci and Del Giudice (2012) show 
that across a sample of European countries, minority shareholders do not earn lower 
abnormal returns when the controlling shareholder takes the company private, and there no 
evidence of performance improvement after the delisting. In the U.S., Marosi and Massoud 
(2007) find that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and the compliance cost are the major 
determinant of the delisting decision. Leuz et al. (2008) find a large impact of the SOX and 
the free cash flow problem associated with the agency cost are highly significant. They also 
include leverage as a control variable but they provide mixed evidence as leverage is only 
significant in the post-SOX period. Both these studies include financial firms for which 
leverage is difficult to measure and its interpretation is affected by capital requirements and 
investor insurance schemes, making the comparison with non-financial companies difficult 
(e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Other studies also investigate delisted companies in the US 
(Hensler et al., 1997; Jain and Kini, 1999, 2000; and Fama and French, 2004), in Europe 
(Vismara et al., 2012), and in the UK (Espenlaub et al., 2012). However, these studies do not 
distinguish between the types of delisting, as they mainly assess the characteristics of 
companies which survive compared to firms that delist from the trading exchange for 
negative reasons. We find that the agency conflicts are less likely to affect the decision to 
delist, which is more likely to be related to the lack of access to financing. However, firms 
which transfer to the relatively more regulated Main market may do so to reduce the free cash 
flow problem given their low managerial ownership, small leverage, and high profitability. 
Overall, not all firms benefit from listing on the stock exchange, and when the motivations 
for listing are not achieved, firms prefer to delist even though this makes them forego the 
substantial costs incurred when they made the decision to come to the stock market. 
Moreover, since this decision is taken after an average of about four years of listing, our 
results imply that voluntary delisted firms were not able to benefit fully from their listing.  
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the 
literature and sets up the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data and methodology. Section 4 
discusses the results, and the conclusions are in Section 5.  
 
2. Review of Literature and Hypotheses 
In this section, we discuss the UK institutional setting and the theories underlying the 
delisting decision.  
2.1. Delisting procedures in the US versus the UK 
In the US, the delisting process goes through two steps. Fist, companies need to delist 
from the exchange (NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ), which may take about 21 days, depending 
on the exchange. In this situation, they will trade over the counter or on the Pink Sheets. The 
firm may then intend to deregister from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In 
doing so, the company needs to file a Form 15 and this needs only the approval of the 
company’s board of directors. In general, the process of deregistration takes up to 60 days 
(Marosi and Massoud, 2007). Once they deregistered, they are not required to provide public 
information (Macey et al., 2008; Marosi and Massoud, 2007).  
In contrast, in the UK, firms that delist should notify the London Stock Exchange to 
cancel their trading on the exchange at least 20 days before the actual event and get an 
approval from no less than 75% of shareholders at a general meeting.2 Once agreed, the 
                                                 
2For AIM rules, see http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/aim/advisers/rules/aim-
rules-for companies.pdf. For the listing rules of companies listed on the Main market, see: 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/main-market/documents/brochures/admission-
and-disclosure-standards.pdf. In the Main market the 75% shareholders’ approval is required only if the firm is 
premium-listed, i.e., if it must meet standards that are over and above (often described as ‘super-equivalent’) 
those set forth in the EU legislation, including the UK’s corporate governance code. Such companies provide 
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exchange will announce the intention to cancel individual securities through the reference 
data service and the intention to cancel issuers through a regulated information service. The 
firm then becomes private and investors have two options; either sell their shares before the 
delisting date or remain shareholders in what will become a privately owned company. 
We focus on AIM where young, risky and high growth firms with high asymmetric 
information and low liquidity chose to be quoted to finance their growth opportunities. Since 
its creation in 1995, the number companies quoted on AIM kept increasing, but from early 
2000s, a significant number of firms delist, and in the last few years, the net flow of 
companies to the AIM is negative, as shown in Figure 1. Thus, this market allows us to 
distinguish between firms that do well and which chose to move to a more regulated London 
Main market and others that fail to generate positive returns and prefer to delist voluntarily. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
2.2. The Survival and Failure of IPOs 
Previous studies investigate the survival of IPOs (Hensler et al., 1997; Jain and Kini, 
1999, 2000; and Fama and French, 2004), but while comparing surviving relative to non-
surviving firms in the post-IPO periods, they do not distinguish among the various reasons 
for delisting. Hensler et al. (1997) compare surviving IPOs with those delisted from 
NASDAQ for negative reasons to find that survival time increases with age, size, and initial 
return, while it decreases with risk factors. Jain and Kini (1999) find that survival increases 
with VC backing and higher investment bank prestige. Fama and French (2004) find that 
                                                                                                                                                        
additional protections to shareholders and they may have access to a broader range of investors and may enjoy a 
lower cost of capital owing to heightened shareholder confidence. A premium listing is only available to equity 
shares issued by commercial trading companies. In contrast, standard-listed firms do not require the 
shareholders’ approval for delisting as they meet only the requirements laid down by EU legislation and the 
overall compliance burden is lighter, both in terms of preparing for listing and on an on-going basis.  
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newly listed firms on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ between 1973 and 1991 have higher 
growth and lower profitability which are likely to decrease their survival rates. Jain and Kini 
(2008) find that strategic investments at the time of IPO, such as diversification through an 
additional line of business, decrease the probability of failure significantly, but the R&D 
effects is positively related to the change in industry-adjusted operating returns on assets five 
years post-IPO but not the year prior to the IPO. In addition, they find no evidence to support 
the relationship between post-IPO performance and firms’ advertising intensity. Bradley et al. 
(2006) show that Canadian penny stocks IPOs (offer price below $5) generate higher initial 
returns but worst long-run underperformance than ordinary IPOs. Carpentier and Suret (2011) 
find that non-surviving companies are less likely to be backed by VC, but the impact of VC 
on the failure risk is not significant, and the probability of survival is significantly affected by 
the initial listing requirements, such as prestigious underwriters and audit firms. In the UK, 
Espenlaub et al. (2012) investigate the effect of AIM regulations to find that survival time is 
increased by tightening the listing requirement, but they do not distinguish across the 
different types of delisting. 
Other studies relate delisting to costs and benefits of quotation. The benefits of listing 
on a stock exchange include relaxing borrowing constraints, greater liquidity, greater 
bargaining power with banks, and the recognition of investors (e.g., Ritter, 1987 and Pagano 
et al., 1998). Despite those benefits, listing is subject to substantial direct costs such as, 
compliance and administrative costs, underwriting and registration fees, and indirect costs 
which relate to the adverse selection and agency conflicts. Bharath and Dittmar (2010) argue 
that since the decision to go public is a trade-off between the costs and benefits of listing, the 
decision to go out of the public market is also likely to be taken when the costs of listing 
exceed the benefits. These costs and benefits relate to access to financing, agency costs, 
asymmetric information, and financial visibility. We define these factors in the data section. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Sample 
We first collect all newly-listed and delisted firms between 1995 and 2009 from the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) website.3 The delisted firms are classified into four main 
categories: (i) voluntary delisting if the firms states that it is coming out of the market at its 
own request; (ii) transfers to the relatively more regulated Main market; (iii) takeovers, which 
occurred in our case when a quoted company takes over a private firm and changes its name, 
making the delisted firm a bidder;4 and (iii) market regulation, a case where the firm listed on 
AIM is asked to delist because of breach of listing requirements, such as the loss of the 
nominated advisor. Figure 2 shows the proportion of each of these categories.  
We exclude financial companies because of their specific characteristics. We also 
exclude 69 firms for which we could not find data. Our final sample includes 380 delisted 
firms split into 155 that went private, 29 that transferred to the Main market, 81 takeovers, 
and 115 delisted due market regulations. We screen all sample firms in DataStream to verify 
that these delisted firms are no longer listed on AIM under their old name. Table 1, Column 2 
presents the year in which the companies decide to delist. Column 3 shows the year in which 
those companies went public. The table indicates that there is an increase in the number of 
delisted firms since the 2000s but the transfers occurred mainly in 1998-2000 and the 
majority of firms that transferred are issued in 1996-1998.  
[Insert Table 1 and Figure 2 here] 
                                                 
3 New Issues and IPO Summary spreadsheet in www.Londonstockexchange.co.uk. 
4 The takeover cases are what are referred to as reverse takeovers. They are mainly shell companies created to 
takeover private companies and then to trade on the name of the private company. We find only two cases of 
normal takeovers where the quoted company is a target. We excluded these two cases. 
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3.2. Definition and sources of the proxy variables  
We define in Table 2 a number of proxy variables to assess whether firms weigh the 
costs and benefits of listing, categorised into access to financing, agency costs, asymmetric 
information, and financial visibility, when they decide to delist from the stock market.  
Getting access to public markets and enhanced transparency enables firms to have a 
greater bargaining power with banks resulting in lower borrowing constraints and 
diversification of sources of finance (Pagano et al., 1998; Bharath and Dittmar, 2006). Some 
firms use this funding to finance their growth opportunities while others go public to 
rebalance their leverage (Pagano et al., 1998). Aslan and Kumar (2011) find that leverage has 
a positive effect on the going-private decision. However, US survey evidence shows that 
financing is not the primary determinant of listing, as firms go public primarily to create 
public shares for use in future acquisitions (Brau, 2010), but in Europe they do so to enhance 
their bargaining power with bankers and to reduce their leverage, while firms that are not able 
to rebalance their leverage decide to go private (Bancel and Mittoo, 2008). Therefore, we 
expect firms to delist if they cannot raise equity capital to rebalance their capital structure. 
We test these arguments by including the probability of seasoned equity offering, leverage 
and growth opportunities, measured by market-to-book and capital expenditure ratios. We 
expect low growth firms with high leverage and low probability of raising equity offering to 
be more likely to delist voluntarily.  
Publicly listed companies potentially suffer from the agency conflict between 
managers and shareholders that emanates from the free cash flow problem, particularly in 
large firms with low growth opportunities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The literature on the 
going-private decision suggests that the agency conflict between managers and shareholders 
would be mitigated through concentrating residual claims among management. Therefore, 
companies with significant free cash flow as well as low growth opportunities are more likely 
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to go private. However, empirical studies report mixed results. Lehn and Poulsen (1989) find 
that free cash flow is a significant factor affecting the going-private decision, in contrast to 
Aslan and Kumar (2011). Marosi and Massoud (2007) report that free cash flow is significant 
for firms with high undistributed cash flow and low growth opportunities. High growth 
companies are likely to benefit from listing on a market as they will overcome their financial 
constrains by getting access to low-cost external financing (e.g. Pagano et al., 1998; Fischer, 
2000; Bharath and Dittmar, 2006). Bharath and Dittmar (2006), Marosi and Massoud (2007), 
and Aslan and Kumar (2011) find that firms with high growth opportunities prefer to stay in 
the market to raise further capital. However, survey evidence is mixed, as Bancel and Mittoo 
(2008) show that CFOs of European firms consider the financing growth opportunities to be a 
significant determinant of the going-public decision, unlike Brau and Fawcett (2006) for US 
firms. We expect firms with low growth opportunities, high free cash flow and high insider 
ownership to choose to delist voluntarily.  
When a company is publicly traded, investors are less informed than insiders about 
the true value of firms resulting in the adverse selection problem. This problem inversely 
affects firms’ quality as well as their share prices. Therefore, firms with asymmetric 
information are more likely to go private to avoid the cost of adverse selection (Bharath and 
Dittmar, 2010). Empirical studies use size and the proportion of intangible assets over total 
assets as proxies for the adverse selection problem, but the evidence is mixed. Pagano et al. 
(1998) and Bharath and Dittmar (2010) provide support for this hypothesis, but Marosi and 
Massoud (2007) find that the estimated coefficients for intangible asset ratios are 
insignificant, implying that information asymmetry is not a factor in the delisting decision. 
We use two proxies to control the asymmetric information, size of the firms and the ratio of 
intangible assets to total assets, and expect small firms with high intangible assets to delist.   
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Mehran and Peristiani (2010) and Bharath and Dittmar (2010) test the financial 
visibility and investor interest as crucial factors over firms’ life cycle. They suggest that IPOs 
that fail to attract investors’ interest because of their lack of financial visibility tend to have 
higher stock price volatility and are more likely to go private. For example, Mehran and 
Peristiani (2010) use analysts’ forecasts, stock turnover, and stock volatility as proxies for 
financial visibility. They find that IPOs that fail to attract investor interest because of lack of 
financial visibility have higher stock price volatility, and are more likely to go private. Their 
result shows that the significance of financial visibility increased since the 1990s. Bancel and 
Mittoo (2008) confirm that investor recognition is a major factor affecting the listing-
decision. We use stock turnover and stock volatility to control for financial visibility. We 
expect firms with high stock volatility and low stock turnover to have low financial visibility, 
and, hence they are more likely to delist.  
Enhanced liquidity is an additional benefit for publicly listed companies as IPOs 
demand ownership dispersion and higher level of liquidity driven by low transaction costs 
(Pagano et al., 1998). Survey evidence also document that share liquidity is an important 
motivation for the decision to go public, and its significance is greater in the UK than in 
Continental Europe (Bancel and Mittoo, 2008). Moreover, Bharath and Dittmar (2010) find 
that firms with less liquidity are more likely to go private. We expect the higher the liquidity, 
the lower the probability of delisting voluntarily. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
We use the LSE website to gather information on subsequent raising capital in the 
post-IPO period and investegate.co.uk website to find the announcement date of the delisting. 
For the missing companies, we hand collect the relevant data from Factiva database. We use 
Thomson One Banker Database to collect the accounting data on balance sheets and income 
statements during the sample period from 1995 to 2009. We extract the stock market data, 
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which includes daily stock prices and indices to compute the stock returns, market 
capitalization, and market-to-book ratio from DataStream. In order to find the market and 
accounting data at the time of IPO, we download the prospectuses from Perfect Filings 
database and hand-collect all data including total debt, total assets, directors’ ownership, 
venture capital, under-pricing, and market capitalisation.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
We first use a matched logit model to predict the factors that affect the delisting 
decision. The dependent variable is binary, one if the company is delisted and zero otherwise. 
We match each delisted firms (test sample) with a firm that remained public (control sample) 
using the date of the IPO and the firm’s first day market capitalisation within 15% range.  
We also use the Cox’s Proportional hazard model to investigate the factors that 
contribute to the delisting decision. Following Mehran and Prestiani (2010) and Bharath and 
Dittmar (2010) we predict the length of time it takes to delist after controlling for related 
variables as follows: 
h (t, X (t)) = h (t,0) exp(B X(t))                                                                                               (1) 
Where is h(t, X(t)) is the hazard rate at time t for a firm with covariates X(t). This 
model controls for the effects of differences between firms as well as changes over time. The 
hazard ratio (exp (B)) indicates the change in the hazard for a unit increase in the independent 
variable. However, for continuous explanatory variables, the hazard ratio measures the 
marginal effect of a unit increase in the independent variable. For discrete explanatory 
variables, the hazard ratio indicates the marginal effect when the event occurs. A hazard ratio 
higher than one means that the delisted firm has a shorter time to the event, but when it is 
equal to one there is no difference between the delisted and control firms. 
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Finally, we use the standard event study methodology to assess the market reaction to 
the delisting announcement. The market model coefficients α and β are computed over the 
estimation period which spans -270 to -21 days relative to the announcement date, with a 
minimum of 60 observations if the firm is delisted in the first 270 days relative to its IPO 
date. We use the FTSE AIM index as a proxy for the market return. 
  
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 shows that on average, firms are quoted on AIM for about 3 years before they 
delist, in contrast to 13 years reported by Bharath and Dittmar (2010) for firms that go private 
through leverage buyouts. However, while voluntary and regulatory delisting occur about 3.5 
years after the IPO, transfers to Main market are more likely to occur within two years of 
IPOs, probably when they satisfy the 3 year trading statements requirements, and 61% of 
takeovers occur during the IPO year or one year after the IPO date.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Table 4, provides the characteristics of delisted companies over their public life. In 
Panel A, we measure the variables over the IPO period. For the going private sample, 
consistent with the access to capital markets hypothesis, the results show that delisted firms 
are over-levered, indicating that they are less likely to have raised equity capital during their 
public life. They also have lower growth opportunities, as measured by the market-to-book 
ratio. While leverage is also higher for firms in the transfer and takeover categories, their 
growth opportunities and capital expenditure are significantly higher than the control firms. 
These findings imply that voluntary delisted firms did not need new capital as they do not 
have any growth opportunities, or they were not able to invest in their growth opportunities 
because they could not raise equity capital. Moreover, voluntary delisted firms have 
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significantly higher managerial ownership than the control firms, but their profitability and 
cash flows are relatively the same, in contrast to firms that transfer to the Main market which 
are more profitable and have higher free cash flow but lower insider ownership.  
In line with the US evidence (Marosi and Massoud, 2007), our results show that 
voluntary delisted firms have higher intangible assets, but they are relatively smaller than the 
control firms, implying that they have a higher probability of asymmetric information, 
particularly since small firms are less likely to be followed by a large number of financial 
analysts. The results also show that voluntary delisted firms, together with those that delist 
because of regulation, have lower liquidity and financial visibility as measured by stock 
turnover, trading volume and stock volatility, although the economic significance of these 
factors is likely to be small. Overall, our results suggest that voluntary delisted firms are 
likely to have low growth opportunities, liquidity and financial visibility, but high leverage, 
and information asymmetries, suggesting that their delisting decision is likely to emanate 
from the relatively higher costs of listing. 
In contrast, firms that delist from AIM to transfer to the Main market or through 
takeovers are more likely to increase their funding opportunities to finance their high growth 
potentials. They are larger and they have higher stock turnover and trading volume, but lower 
stock price volatility. Our results imply that firms transfer to the Main market when they 
satisfy the listing requirement to finance their growth opportunities, while those that cannot 
raise funds prefer to delist from AIM voluntarily and become private. 
Following Bharath and Dittmare (2010), we test for robustness of our results by 
measuring our data for both the test and control samples one year after the IPO date. The 
results reported in Table 4, Panel B, are relatively the same as those reported in Panel A. 
They show that voluntary delisted firms have significantly higher leverage, greater insider 
ownership, but lower growth opportunities. However, since few IPOs in our sample delisted 
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within one year of their public life, our results may suffer from survivorship bias. We 
overcome this problem by comparing the characteristics of both our samples at the exact time 
of the IPO using data collected by hand from prospectuses. The results reported in Table 4, 
Panel C, are relatively similar; they show that voluntary delisted firms are more likely to have 
high leverage and low growth opportunities even when they came as IPOs. Although these 
IPOs may have come to the market for other reasons than financing their growth 
opportunities, our results suggest that they are less likely to have used their quotation to 
rebalance their capital structure. In contrast, firms that transferred to the Main market had 
high growth opportunities that the control firms even at the IPO date. In addition, they are 
larger and have higher free cash flow, profitability, and stock turnover, but lower insider 
ownership and stock volatility than the control firms.  
Insert Table 4 here] 
In Table 5, we assess how the firms’ characteristics have changed from their IPO date 
to the delisting date. Following Bharath and Dittmare (2010), we present the data for the year 
following the IPO and the year prior to the delisting time. The results show that leverage of 
the voluntary delisted firms increased significantly over the two periods from 16 to 21 
percent. At the same time, their market to book declined from 2.35 to 1.72, their market value 
went down from 2.37 to 2.02 and their trading volume from 2.60 to 1.89, but their insider 
ownership and proportion of intangible assets went up from 46 to 58 percent and 24 to 38 
percent, respectively. The results based on the medians are qualitatively similar. The results 
suggest that during their public life, firms that delisted voluntarily came up to the market as 
high growth firms but drifted towards maturity. These firms may, thus, have less need for 
additional capital to finance their investments, and, consequently, they prefer to delist. 
Alternatively, they were not able to access the financial market to raise capital to create new 
investment opportunities and to maintain their high growth status. Interestingly, their capital 
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expenditure, free cash flow, return on assets and stock turnover declined but not significantly. 
The increase in managerial ownership and the decrease in the free cash flow do not provide 
support for the agency costs explanation of the decision delist voluntarily, unlike the going 
private through buyout (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989).  
In contrast, firms that delisted for other reasons exhibit significantly different 
characteristics. Although leverage of firms that transferred to the Main market did not change 
significantly over the two periods, and it is relatively similar to that of voluntary delisted 
firms, they maintained their high investments, growth opportunities, free cash flow and 
profitability, their insider ownership is lower and declined over the listing period, and they 
are larger. Moreover, their market value, stock turnover and trading volume increased 
significantly from their IPO to the delisting date. Overall, these results suggest that these 
firms transfer to the Main market to expand and to finance their growth opportunities and to 
mitigate their free cash flow problems, as in the Main market, the corporate governance 
requirements are much higher that AIM’s. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
In Figure 3, we trace the changes in some of these fundamental factors two years after 
the IPO date. In line with the results reported above, Figure 3, Panel A, shows that, relative to 
the control firms, leverage at the time of the IPO is higher for both sets of delisted firms. 
However, we note that leverage increased in the first two years after their IPO for voluntarily 
delisted firms, while it decreased for those that transferred to the Main market. This suggests 
that voluntary delisted firms did not raise equity after their IPOs, and thus they probably had 
to use more debt to finance their investments, unless if they were making losses with 
subsequent decrease in equity. We assess further the annual performance of our firms during 
their first two years of being public by analysing their trends in profitability, growth 
opportunities and size. Panel B. shows that growth opportunity as measured by the market-to-
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book ratio increased and then declined for voluntary delisted firms, but the reverse occurred 
for firms that transferred to the Main market. In conjunction with the results reported in 
Tables 4, these findings suggest that voluntary delisted firms needed more capital to finance 
their investments in their first year of trading, but in year 2, their growth potentials decreased. 
We find, but not report for space and comparative purposes, that this decline in growth 
opportunities carried on up to their delisting year. In contrast, the market-to-book ratio of 
firms that transferred to the Main market is higher than the remaining firms at the IPO date, 
decreased in year 1 but increased in subsequent years. In terms of profitability, Panel C 
shows the contrasting differences between our sample firms. In particular, firms that delisted 
voluntarily generate consistent losses compared to control firms and those that transferred to 
Main market. Finally, Panel D shows that voluntary delisted firms kept losing value, in 
contrast to those that transferred to the Main market which created value since their IPO date. 
Overall, these results are in line with our findings from the univariate analysis. They highlight 
the stark contrast between our sample firms, and suggest that fundamental factors, such as 
size, financing, profitability and growth options explain the decision to delist from the AIM 
market and to either transfer to the Main market or to delist voluntarily.  
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
4.2. Logit regression results5 
We use the data at the exact time of the IPO and estimate the logit regression in order 
to investigate whether the inherent characteristics of the firm at the time of the IPO could 
predict the ultimate delisting decision. The results are reported in Table 6, Panel A. Data 
                                                 
5 We use, but not report, two goodness-of-fit tests, Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) and Andrews (1988) to 
compare the fitted expected values to the actual values by group, and if these differences are large, we reject the 
model as providing an insufficient fit to the data. We report Deviance statistics which support the goodness-fit 
in all our regressions. 
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unavailability in prospectuses has lead us not to consider variables such as capital 
expenditure and free cash flow, but we assess the impact of under-pricing, VC backing and 
Nomad reputations. The dependent variable is a dummy set to one if a firm is delisted and 
zero otherwise. The results provide strong evidence of the impact of leverage and growth 
opportunities on the voluntary delisting decision and those that delisted because of regulation. 
For firms that transfer to the Main market, we find only underpricing that is negative and 
significant, consistent with Michaely and Shaw (1994), who argue that firms with higher 
degree of asymmetric information offer their share at a discount to their true market value to 
entice less informed investors. They find that firms that underprice less have better future 
performance and more likely to issue seasoned equity offerings. In line with these arguments, 
our results suggest that firms with lower initial returns have lower adverse selection problem 
and stronger future performance. As a result, they are more likely to transfer to the Main 
market. The remaining variables, including VC backing, Nomad reputation and insider 
ownership, do not affect the decision to delist voluntarily or to transfer to the Main market.  
In Panel B, we test for robustness of our results when we measure our explanatory 
variables one year before the delisting date. The results confirm the strong positive impact of 
leverage and insider ownership, and the negative effect of growth opportunities, and the 
probability of a seasoned equity offering on the decision to delist voluntarily. The pre-
delisting stock price performance is also negative, in line with Hansen and Öqvist (2012). 
The results for ownership structure are in line with Amihud et al. (1990), who find that firms 
controlled by major shareholders are reluctant to use equity, and thus prefer to delist. In 
contrast, firms that transfer to the Main market are likely to be large, to have raised equity 
capital, and to have high free cash flow, profitability, and pre-delisting stock returns, and 
lower stock price volatility. The high profitability of firms that transfer to Main market is in 
line with the agency conflict predictions and consistent with the argument of Arcot et al. 
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(2007) who find that AIM companies are encouraged to join to the Main market when they 
demonstrate their profitability.  
Interestingly, the results only support the market access hypothesis in Panel A, since 
leverage and market-to-book as a proxy for growth opportunities, are the only constantly 
significant coefficients in our regression, in line with Marosi and Massoud (2007) and Leuz 
et al. (2008) who find that delisted companies in the US have significantly higher leverage. 
However, these results apply only to firms that delist voluntarily or those that do so because 
of regulation. For firms that transfer to the Main market other factors such as performance 
and stock price volatility appear to be the main drivers of the delisting decision, while for or 
takeovers insider ownership and SEO dummy are the main factors. The recent literature for 
going private firms report mixed evidence for the impact of leverage as Mehran and Peristiani 
(2010) find a positive and significant effect on the decision to go private. In contrast, Witmer 
(2005) does not find any impact of leverage and growth opportunities on the voluntary cross-
delisting decision, but shows that size and stock turnover are the key determinants of cross-
delisting as smaller firms with low stock turnover are more likely to delist, suggesting that the 
factors which affect the cross-delisting are different from the delisting decision.  
Our results do not provide strong support for the agency conflicts as free cash flow 
and return on assets, as proxies for the agency conflict between shareholders and managers 
are negative and statistically significant. In particular, firms that generate higher return on 
assets are less likely to delist voluntarily. Similarly our results do not provide strong support 
for the information asymmetry, liquidity and financial visibility hypothesis. In particular, at 
the time of the IPO, these hypotheses cannot forecast the determinants of the delisting 
decision. Our results are not consistent with those of Liu et al. (2012) who find the delisting 
from the Tokyo Stock Exchange is driven by liquidity. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
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4.3. Cox proportional hazard regression results 
In this section, we use the Cox proportional hazard model to investigate the factors 
that contribute to the delisting decision. The hazard ratios defined in Equation (1) are 
reported in Table 7 for all samples. The results show that voluntary delisted companies have a 
higher hazard rate of delisting if they have greater leverage and lower growth opportunities as 
measured by the market-to-book ratio. These results are in line with the market access 
prediction. The impact of leverage on the hazard rate of delisting is also positive for those 
companies that delisted because of regulations while it is negatively related to the hazard rate 
of delisting for takeovers. Thus, apart from transferred companies, leverage has the highest 
marginal effect on the delisting decision. However, for voluntary delisted companies and 
those delisted due to regulations, leverage increases the hazard rate of delisting, indicating 
that the hazard rate of the voluntary delisting and delisting due to regulations increases about 
1.52, and 2.87 times, respectively, for a unit increase in leverage. While for takeovers, an 
increase in leverage decreases the hazard rate of delisting about 2.80 times. For transferred 
companies, return on assets has the higher marginal effect on the delisting decision. Unlike 
voluntary delisted companies, growth opportunities are not statistically significant for other 
forms of delisting.      
In line with the agency hypothesis, we find a positive and significant relationship 
between insider ownership and the probability of voluntary delisting, suggesting that the 
delisting decision is smoother for firms that are more closely held. However, insider 
ownership is negative and significant for takeovers and insignificant for delisted companies 
that transferred to the main market or those delisted because of regulations.  
 The results also suggest that firms with greater operating performance are likely to 
upgrade to the bigger market while they have a lower hazard rate of delisting as a breach of 
legislation. Firms also have a greater hazard rate of delisting if they are smaller, supporting 
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the asymmetric information hypothesis. These results are robust across all models. Moreover, 
asset tangibility does not affect the decision to transfer to the Main market or takeovers, but it 
is positively related to the voluntary delisting decision or breaching the legislation. 
Following Mehran and Peristiani (2010), we also include stock volatility and stock 
turnover to assess the liquidity and financial visibility effects. The results show that the 
impact of stock turnover on the voluntary delisting decision is negative but not significant. 
We also use the log of trading volume as an additional proxy for liquidity and, in contrast to 
the stock turnover evidence, the coefficient is significant. The results also show that firms are 
more likely to upgrade to the Main market if they have higher liquidity as measured by 
trading volume. Moreover, in contrast to our prediction, the relationship between stock 
volatility and the probability of the delisting decision is not statistically significant. Mehran 
and Peristiani (2010) also do not support the impact of stock volatility, as they find the 
negative coefficient of stock volatility which is not consistent with the financial visibility 
hypothesis. They suggest that firms with higher probability of failure are less likely to go 
private supporting the financial distress notion.  
We control for seasoned equity offerings and high-tech industries in all specifications. 
The effect of the firms’ ability to conduct a seasoned equity offering is negative and 
significant for voluntary delisted and breach of legislation, indicating that the hazard rate of 
delisting decreases as firms have a greater market access to issue equity, while it has a 
positive impact on takeovers and an insignificant effect on the probability of upgrading to the 
Main market. In addition, firms that operate in high-tech industries are less likely to delist 
because of regulations or takeovers. However, the impact of industry is not consistent in all 
specifications, as for transfers and voluntary delisting, the impact is insignificant.  
[Insert Table 7 here]  
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4.4.  Analysis of the ex-post market access 
We expand these arguments by investigating further the consequences of leverage and 
debt-equity financing over the IPO life cycle of delisted companies. Previous results show 
that leverage is significantly greater for voluntarily delisted firms, compared to those that 
remained public. We follow Pagano et al. (1998) to assess how leverage of the delisted and 
the remained public companies evolve over the IPO life cycle. We also investigate the impact 
of return on assets over the IPO period to expand further the results reported in Tables 6 and 
7. We use the following alternative specification to compare the ex-post performance of the 
voluntary delisted companies relative to those companies that remained public:  
                                                                                (2) 
Where ui, and dt are a firm specific and calendar year specific effect, respectively. IPOt-j are 
dummy variables equal to one if year t-j was the IPO year, and IPOt-n is a dummy variable set 
to one if the IPO took place more than 4 years before. This estimation is based on the fixed-
effects model, which controls for the effect of the IPO and the four subsequent years by 
dummy variables.  
Table 8, Panels A, B, and C show that firms that remained public deleverage after the 
IPO. This finding is in line with Pagano et al. (1998) and Aslan and Kumar (2011), who find 
that leverage decreases in the post-IPO period due to substantial equity issued. Panels A and 
B also show that firms that remained public are more likely to have raised equity capital over 
three years after their IPO, but debt issuance is not significant. These results are consistent 
with Pagano et al. (1998), who find that equity issuance increases significantly over three 
years after the IPO. However, Table 8, Panel A, shows that for voluntary delisted firms 
leverage increases in the second year after the IPO, debt financing increases from the first 
year after the IPO, while there is no considerable change in the equity financing except the 
second and the fourth year after the IPO, which shows that equity financing declines 
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significantly for those companies that delist voluntarily, probably due to share repurchases. 
For other delisted firms, debt and equity financing do not change significantly over their IPO 
period. The results also show that return on assets declines mainly in the second year after the 
IPO for firms that delisted voluntarily, or through takeovers, or breach of legislation, while it 
increases for firms that transferred to the Main market.  
 [Insert Table 8 here] 
4.5. The market valuation of the delisting decision 
We investigate the market reaction to the delisting decision using the standard event 
study methodology. We collect stock prices from the DataStream for the period from January 
1994 to December 2010. We then use the investegate.co.uk website, which offers a large 
archive for announcements to find delisting announcements. In addition, we use Factiva and 
hand-collect delisting announcements for the remaining firms with missing data. In Table 9, 
Panel A, we analysed six different windows, [-360,-2], [-20,-2], [-5,+5], [-1,+1], [0, +1], and 
[+2, +20]. We report results based on event window [0, 1], but our results are relatively 
similar when we use [-1, +1], and [-5, +5] days relative to the delisting announcement date.  
Table 9, Panel A, shows that, on the announcement date, voluntary delisted firms 
generate excess returns of -8.32%, in line with the -9% and -12% observed by Leuz et al. 
(2008) and Marosi and Massoud (2007), respectively, in the US. Similarly, Liu (2005) finds 
that foreign companies that delist from the US stock exchange markets because of 
involuntary reasons experience abnormal return of -4.5%, statistically higher than the -8.5% 
experienced by domestically-delisted companies in the US reported by Sanger and Peter 
(1990). This negative performance of delisted firms is different from the positive excess 
returns observed for firms that go private trough leveraged buyouts (LBO, MBO, IBO), as 
Renneboog et al.(2007) report 11% for the [-5, 5] window in the UK and Leuz et al.(2008) 
find +14% for both the [0, 1] and [0, 2] windows in the US. In the pre-announcement period, 
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the excess returns are also negative. This negative performance appears to be permanent as 
the post-event period excess returns are negative, but not significant. Similar negative 
performance is observed for firms that delist because of breach of legislation.  
In contrast, firms that transfer to the Main Market generate positive returns 
throughout the event period, but unlike Jenkinson and Ramadorai (2008), who find that the 
announcement date excess returns amount to +5%, our results indicate that these excess 
returns for our sample firms is limited to the pre-event period.  
Finally, the results indicate that firms that delist through takeovers generate strong 
negative returns. As stated above, these cases are reverse takeovers where the delisted firm is 
the bidder acquiring a target and trades subsequently under the name of the target.  
 The results of Table 9 do not control for firm characteristics while our focus is to 
investigate the leverage effects of the voluntary delisting decision, we distinguish between 
the delisted firms that experience an increased leverage in the year prior to the delisting 
decision and those with a decrease in leverage. The results reported in Table 9, Panel B, show 
that firms that increased their leverage in the year of delisting experience significantly lower 
excess returns. These firms appear to be the worst hit by their lack of raising capital 
constraints. 
[Insert Table 9 here]  
5. Conclusions 
We find evidence that firms delist voluntarily from the London Alternative 
Investment Market when they are not able to raise equity, their growth opportunities and 
profitability are low, and they generative negative returns.  In contrast, firms that transfer to 
the Main market generate positive returns and have high growth potential, suggesting that 
these firms move to the larger and more regulated stock market to increase their choice 
probability of raising external financing, even though this entails higher regulatory costs.   
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Firms that delist because of breach of regulation and those that delist through reverse 
takeovers generate also negative returns.  
Recently, the US literature distinguishes between the going private decision, which 
happens mainly through leverage buyout and the voluntary delisting decision (Leuz et al., 
2008; Marosi and Massoud, 2007). To the best of our knowledge, there have been no 
previous studies investigating the determinants and the consequences of the voluntary 
delisting decision under a special regulatory institutional setting in the UK where firms are 
allowed to delist and still to have their shares traded in the private market. We focus on the 
effects of leverage on the delisting decision, as previous studies suggest that access to capital 
markets is the main motivation for the going-public decision. Going public in order to raise 
further capital would affect firms’ capital structure and thus we expect a significant impact of 
leverage on the delisting decision. We show that firms that could not raise further equity 
capital are more likely to opt for voluntary delisting. Unfortunately we do not have full data 
to assess what happens to these firms after they become private. Further research will assess 
the extent to which voluntary delisting increases the survival rate of these firms and leads 
them to become more profitable and to come back to the stock market. 
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Table 1: Time Series Distribution of Delisted Companies 
The table presents the annual distribution of our sample firm by event and IPO years and by 
delisting method.   
Year Voluntary Delisting Transferred firms to 
Main market 
Takeovers 
 
Delisted due to 
regulation 
 Event Year IPO Year Event Year IPO Year Event Year IPO Year Event Year IPO Year 
1995  4      1 
1996  14  5  2  4 
1997  16  5  2  7 
1998 0 4 1 3 1 3  5 
1999 8 13 5 2 2 2  2 
2000 12 20 6 2 8 11  12 
2001 8 7 1 1 2 5 2 6 
2002 5 8 3 1 2 2 4 3 
2003 13 6 1 3  3 8 5 
2004 10 24 3 5 7 18 1 29 
2005 13 26 0 2 24 17  27 
2006 24 10 1  15 9 2 13 
2007 13 3 3  9 7 24 1 
2008 13  3  9  42  
2009 36  2  2  32  
         
Total 155 155 29 29 81 81 115 115 
The second, fourth, sixth, and eighth columns of this table present the number of firms in our sample that delist 
voluntarily, those that transferred to the Main market, Takeovers, and delisted companies due to regulations in 
each year. The third, fifth, seventh, and ninth columns show the time series distribution of those firms based on 
their IPO year.  
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Table 2: Definition of the Proxy variables and the hypotheses tested 
Variables Description Hypothesis Sign 
Leverage 
MB 
Capex/Sales  
Total Debt/Total Assets 
Market value over book value of equity 
Capital expenditure/ Total Sales 
Access to capital/ Raising capital 
Access to capital/ Raising capital 
Access to capital/ Raising capital 
+ 
- 
- 
ROA EBIT/Total assets Agency (Free cash flow problem) + 
Free cash flow Free Cash Flow/Total Assets Agency (Free cash flow problem) + 
Insider ownership Directors’ ownership/Outstanding shares Agency (Free cash flow problem) + 
ROA EBIT/Total assets Agency (Free cash flow problem) + 
Size 
Intangibility 
Log market value of equity 
Intangible Assets/Total Assets 
Asymmetric information 
Asymmetric information 
- 
+ 
Ln Volume 
 
Stock Turnover 
Natural Logarithm of daily shares traded 
in past 12 months 
Volume/Outstanding shares  
Liquidity 
 
Liquidity/ Financial visibility 
- 
 
- 
Stock  volatility Stock returns’ annual standard deviation Financial visibility + 
Under-pricing  1st price day - price offer/ price offer Asymmetric information + 
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Table 3: Number of Years that Delisted Firms Were Publicly Trading 
 Voluntary 
Delisting 
Transfers to Main 
market 
Takeovers Delisted 
regulations 
All delisted
 N % N % N % N % N % 
IPO 1 1 2 4 23 28 0 0 26 7 
+1 14 9 4 14 27 33 3 3 48 13 
+2 23 15 8 28 11 14 20 17 62 16 
+3 27 17 7 24 7 9 25 22 66 17 
+4 40 26 5 17 7 9 23 20 75 20 
+5 19 12 1 3 3 4 18 16 41 11 
6-12 31 20 2 7 3 4 26 23 62 16 
Total 155 100 29 100 81 100 115 100 380 100 
This table presents number of years that firms stayed public before delisting. The sample includes 155 firms that 
delisted voluntarily, 29 companies that transferred to the Main market, 81 takeovers, and 115 companies that 
delisted due to regulations between 1995 and 2009. The second, fourth, sixth, and eighth columns report the 
number of delisted companies. Their proportion and cumulative distribution are in column 3, 5, 7, and 9.  The 
number and proportion of total delisted companies are reported in the last two columns. 
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Table 4: Characteristics of Delisted and Control Firms 
 Voluntary Delisting (1) Transfers to the Main market (2) Takeovers Delisted due to regulations (1)-(2) 
 Delisted 
Firms 
Control 
Firms 
t  
MW 
Delisted 
Firms 
Control 
Firms 
t  
MW 
Delisted 
Firms 
Control 
Firms 
t  
MW 
Delisted 
Firms 
Control 
Firms 
t  
MW 
t  
MW 
  Panel A. Variables measured over the IPO period  
Market Access         
Leverage 
 
Capex/Sales 
 
MB 
0.16 
(0.09) 
0.46 
(0.04) 
2.35 
(1.40) 
0.13 
(0.04) 
0.40 
(0.03) 
4.04 
(1.88) 
3.52*** 
4.02*** 
0.56 
1.05 
-2.46** 
3.82*** 
0.18 
(0.08) 
0.56 
(0.04) 
4.60 
(1.84) 
0.13 
(0.04) 
0.36 
(0.02) 
3.12 
(1.46) 
2.11** 
2.17** 
2.02** 
2.32** 
1.97** 
0.36 
0.21 
(0.10) 
0.57 
(0.56) 
0.57 
(0.51) 
0.17 
(0.07) 
0.44 
(0.32) 
0.29 
(0.44) 
2.52** 
1.93* 
2.02** 
1.99** 
2.26** 
1.09 
0.21 
(0.12) 
0.45 
(0.37) 
0.50 
(0.35) 
0.13 
(0.10) 
0.44 
(0.21) 
0.43 
(0.35) 
0.11 
1.02 
1.47 
1.12 
0.64 
1.02 
-0.68 
(0.26) 
-2.65*** 
(1.84)* 
-0.90 
(3.28)*** 
Agency Conflicts          
Free Cash Flow 
 
ROA 
 
Insider Ownership 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.22 
(0.00) 
46.65 
(49.11) 
-0.40 
(0.00) 
-0.56 
(0.00) 
25.48 
(15.11) 
1.02 
1.90* 
1.32 
1.05 
9.95*** 
15.05*** 
0.06 
(0.11) 
-0.09 
(0.06) 
36.58 
(37.14) 
-0.15 
(0.00) 
-0.33 
(-0.03) 
40.56 
(39.48) 
4.691*** 
5.40*** 
2.99*** 
4.95*** 
-1.56 
1.47 
-0.06 
(-0.01) 
-0.31 
(-0.02) 
59.27 
(16.07) 
-0.10 
(-0.01) 
-0.26 
(-0.01) 
46.64 
(12.02) 
1.06 
1.00 
-0.64 
1.21 
1.69* 
3.05*** 
-0.14 
(-0.01) 
-0.46 
(-0.03) 
20.50 
(20.00) 
-0.17 
(-0.01) 
-0.37 
(-0.03) 
20.07 
(12.68) 
0.37 
1.02 
1.12 
0.98 
0.92 
1.45 
-2.58*** 
(4.09)*** 
-1.32 
(3.31)*** 
2.53** 
(3.02)*** 
Asymmetric Information          
Intangibility 
 
Size 
0.30 
(0.07) 
2.40 
(2.37) 
0.22 
(0.13) 
2.88 
(2.52) 
2.88*** 
1.99** 
-2.56*** 
1.78* 
0.20 
(0.22) 
3.72 
(2.52) 
0.27 
(0.24) 
2.52 
(1.88) 
-0.23 
0.28 
2.23** 
1.98** 
0.35 
(0.32) 
2.86 
(2.86) 
0.27 
(0.16) 
2.20 
(2.25) 
3.17*** 
2.09** 
6.30*** 
1.98** 
0.20 
(0.05) 
0.62 
(2.56) 
0.22 
(0.10) 
1.55 
(2.58) 
1.11 
1.04 
0.93 
1.50 
0.64 
(2.31)** 
-5.25*** 
(6.74)*** 
Liquidity and Financial Visibility          
Stock Turnover 
 
Ln(Trade Volume) 
 
Stock Volatility 
0.37 
(0.17) 
2.98 
(2.55) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.52 
(0.229) 
4.49 
(4.00) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
-1.75* 
3.02*** 
-4.89*** 
3.57*** 
-1.98* 
3.00*** 
0.90 
(0.56) 
4.05 
(3.96) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.73 
(0.30) 
3.99 
(2.13) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.54 
4.39*** 
1.52 
1.95** 
-3.99*** 
5.11*** 
1.77 
(0.43) 
9.33 
(9.56) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.72 
(0.13) 
8.55 
(8.79) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
1.67* 
3.10*** 
4.69*** 
2.77*** 
-1.40 
1.20 
8.70 
(0.09) 
0.03 
(9.12) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
9.08 
(0.22) 
0.04 
(9.35) 
0.02 
(0.00) 
-2.97*** 
1.12 
-3.85*** 
1.57 
2.41** 
1.95** 
-4.32*** 
(6.48)*** 
-2.20** 
(1.99)** 
1.17 
(0.50) 
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Table 4 Cont. Voluntary Delisting (1) Transfers to the Main market (2) Takeovers (3) Delisted due to regulations (4) (1)-(2) 
 Delisted 
Firms 
Contro
l Firms 
t  
MW 
Deliste
d Firms 
Control 
Firms 
t  
MW 
Delisted 
Firms 
Contro
l Firms 
t  
MW 
Deliste
d Firms 
Contro
l Firms 
t  
MW 
t  
MW 
  Panel B. Variables measured one year before delisting   
Market Access     
-0.11 
0.31 
-2.25** 
3.51*** 
1.98** 
4.32*** 
2.88*** 
3.00*** 
4.35*** 
1.61 
-0.40 
2.28** 
1.94* 
0.12 
-1.85* 
2.30** 
 
 
-3.21*** 
0.02 
-4.88*** 
3.99*** 
-1.09 
0.10 
-2.65*** 
2.99*** 
Leverage 
 
Capex/Sales 
 
MB 
0.21 
(0.16) 
0.25 
(0.04) 
1.72 
(1.30) 
0.11 
(0.04) 
(0.69) 
(0.10) 
3.41 
(1.95) 
2.99*** 
3.01*** 
-2.74*** 
1.98** 
-4.02** 
1.92* 
0.13 
(0.03) 
0.72 
(0.08) 
3.45 
(3.27) 
 
0.12 
(0.15) 
0.07 
(0.07) 
38.45 
(35.01) 
 
0.08 
(0.07) 
3.78 
(3.88) 
 
 
0.99 
(0.58) 
3.14 
(2.00) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.67 
(0.10) 
0.07 
(0.02) 
0.56 
(0.04) 
1.88 
(2.67) 
 
0.10 
(-0.01) 
0.00 
(-0.01) 
44.97 
(44.60) 
 
0.25 
(0.13) 
2.72 
(2.79) 
 
0.30 
(0.20) 
3.00 
(1.86) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(-0.02) 
1.90* 
0.84 
2.01** 
1.62 
3.15*** 
1.95** 
 
1.23 
2.52** 
1.98** 
2.28** 
-1.68* 
1.90* 
-2.66*** 
1.75* 
3.15*** 
2.81*** 
 
5.25*** 
3.54*** 
1.61 
1.84* 
-1.57 
1.69* 
6.05*** 
3.52*** 
0.08 
(0.00) 
0.48 
(0.67) 
2.94 
(1.00) 
 
-0.05 
(0.03) 
-0.08 
(-0.02) 
25.41 
(11.44)
 
0.15 
(0.11) 
2.90 
(3.16) 
 
  
1.01 
(0.15) 
8.68 
(8.86) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.20 
(-0.02) 
0.13 
(0.06) 
0.42 
(0.22) 
1.58 
(0.67) 
 
0.01 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(-0.01) 
20.85 
(10.25) 
 
0.12 
(0.02) 
2.60 
(2.47) 
 
 
0.29 
(0.10) 
8.09 
(8.11) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.27 
(-0.08) 
-1.96** 
2.32** 
1.35 
3.20*** 
3.85*** 
2.65*** 
 
-1.21 
0.52 
-1.35 
1.00 
1.65* 
0.87 
1.54 
2.58*** 
1.98** 
2.01** 
 
 
3.88*** 
1.82* 
1.95** 
2.20** 
1.12 
1.67* 
1.48 
1.69* 
0.22 
(0.15) 
0.59 
(0.34) 
1.55 
(0.30) 
 
-0.30 
(-0.16) 
-0.53 
(-0.08) 
58.51 
(19.54) 
 
0.25 
(0.20) 
2.29 
(2.45) 
 
 
0.25 
(0.08) 
9.43 
(9.05) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.35 
(-0.22) 
0.11 
(0.02) 
0.23 
(0.10) 
0.55 
(0.20) 
 
0.13 
(-0.02) 
-0.21 
(-0.03) 
25.93 
(14.50) 
 
0.22 
(0.13) 
2.58 
(2.51) 
 
 
0.40 
(0.29) 
9.11 
(9.00) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.13 
(-0.12) 
4.32*** 
2.89*** 
3.10*** 
2.95*** 
3.52*** 
2.05** 
 
-3.52*** 
4.00*** 
-2.99*** 
1.68* 
3.45*** 
2.25** 
1.31 
1.95** 
-1.84* 
0.78 
 
 
-2.41** 
3.01*** 
1.95** 
0.58 
1.70* 
1.22 
-4.52*** 
2.80*** 
Agency Conflicts 
Free Cash 
Flow 
ROA 
 
Insider 
Ownership 
-0.07 
(-0.03) 
-0.18 
(-0.04) 
57.67 
(57.15) 
-0.02 
(0.00) 
-0.08 
(0.00) 
45.70 
(44.63) 
-1.04 
0.25 
-1.95** 
1.35 
2.02** 
2.75*** 
Asymmetric Information 
Intangibility 
 
Size 
0.38 
(0.25) 
2.02 
(2.15) 
0.23 
(0.13) 
2.71 
(2.79) 
3.21** 
2.11** 
-2.55** 
1.99** 
Liquidity and Financial Visibility 
Stock Turnover 
 
Ln(Trade 
Volume) 
Stock Volatility 
 
CAAR[-365,0] 
0.11 
(0.09) 
1.89 
(1.00) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.50 
(-0.30) 
0.35 
(0.23) 
3.97 
(3.95) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.12 
(-0.08) 
-3.87*** 
4.25*** 
-4.31*** 
2.87*** 
-0.51 
0.11 
-5.28*** 
3.41*** 
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Table 4 Continued 
 Voluntary Delisting (1) Transfers to the Main market (2) Takeovers (3) Delisted due to regulations (4) (1)-(2) 
 Delisted 
Firms 
Control 
Firms 
t  
MW 
Deliste
d Firms 
Control 
Firms 
t  
MW 
Delisted 
Firms 
Control 
Firms 
t  
MW 
Deliste
d Firms 
Control 
Firms 
t  
MW 
t  
MW 
  Panel C. Variables measured at the IPO Date – Prospectus and first day pricing data   
Market Access     
-1.12 
0.56 
-3.58*** 
2.25** 
 
1.21 
1.55 
1.27 
1.56 
 
 
 
1.38 
1.32 
 
1.63 
1.98** 
Leverage 
 
MB 
 
0.16 
(0.08) 
2.22 
(1.91) 
0.12 
(0.03) 
4.33 
(2.80) 
2.25** 
1.99** 
-3.58*** 
5.25*** 
0.17 
(0.07) 
4.58 
(2.56) 
 
-0.05 
(0.07) 
47.47 
(47.22) 
 
 
 
2.63 
(1.99) 
 
0.08 
(0.06) 
0.013 
(0.03) 
4.09 
(2.40) 
 
-0.27 
(-0.22) 
55.88 
(52.97) 
 
 
 
2.21 
(1.75) 
 
0.14 
(0.10) 
1.42 
1.56 
1.99** 
0.10 
 
0.36 
2.18** 
-0.78 
2.10** 
 
 
 
0.85 
1.02 
 
-1.98** 
-2.05** 
0.14 
(0.05) 
2.27 
(1.53) 
 
-0.06 
(-0.02) 
54.75 
(50.31) 
 
 
 
2.00 
(1.90) 
 
0.09 
(0.01) 
0.12 
(0.03) 
1.26 
(1.11) 
 
0.03 
(-0.02) 
55.38 
(56.04) 
 
 
 
2.09 
(2.01) 
 
0.11 
(0.02) 
1.25 
(1.02) 
2.57** 
(3.51)*** 
 
-1.98** 
(0.24) 
-1.08 
(1.60) 
 
 
 
-1.23 
(0.68) 
 
-1.56 
(0.35) 
0.19 
(0.10) 
4.06 
(2.82) 
 
-0.40 
(-0.04) 
41.35 
(40.65) 
 
 
 
2.57 
(2.59) 
 
0.04 
(0.00) 
0.10 
(0.01) 
5.80 
(3.20) 
 
-0.22 
(-0.04) 
45.24 
(49.19) 
 
 
 
2.74 
(2.78) 
 
0.01 
(0.00) 
2.01** 
(3.25)*** 
-2.88*** 
(2.15)** 
 
-1.89* 
(0.05) 
-1.25 
(1.45) 
 
 
 
-1.00 
(1.61) 
 
1.64 
(0.74) 
Agency Conflicts 
ROA 
 
Insider 
Ownership 
 
-0.10 
(0.02) 
51.35 
(54.50) 
-0.27 
(0.01) 
44.81 
(45.11) 
1.98** 
0.13 
3.56*** 
4.89*** 
Asymmetric Information 
Size 2.70 
(2.08) 
2.56 
(1.95) 
1.28 
0.89 
Liquidity and Financial Visibility 
Under-pricing 0.12 
(0.13) 
0.10 
(0.08) 
0.82 
1.08 
The table, Panel A, presents the means (medians) of the characteristics of the delisted and IPO date and size matched control firms. The total sample includes 380 delisted 
firms split into 155 that delisted voluntarily, 29 transferred to the Main market, 81 takeovers, and 115 delisted companies due to regulations between 1995 and 2009. The data 
in Panel B is based on the reported financial statements during the first year following the IPO date, while that in Panel C is at the IPO date using hand-collected data from 
the prospectuses. The t-statistics for the differences in means and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (MW) of the differences in medians are reported in the last column. The 
remaining variables are defined in Table 2. ***, **,* indicate that the estimate is significant at the 1 %, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 5: Changes in Characteristics of Delisting Firms between the IPO and the Delisting Year 
 Voluntary Delisting Transfers to the Main market Takeovers Delisted due to regulations 
 t = IPO  t = Delisted t (MW) t = IPO t =Delisted t (MW) t =IPO  t =Delisted t (MW) t = IPO t = Delisted t (MW) 
Leverage 0.16 0.21 -2.35** 0.15 0.13 0.68 0.14 0.08 2.64*** 0.21 0.22 -1.05 
 (0.12) (0.16) (1.91)* (0.05) (0.03) (0.54) (0.04) (0.00) (1.84)* (0.11) (0.15) (0.24) 
Capex/Sales 0.35 0.25 1.68* 0.42 0.72 -1.98** 0.41 0.48 -1.18 0.65 0.59 2.01** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.25) (0.05) (0.08) (1.62) (0.65) (0.67) (0.25) (0.64) (0.34) (2.92)*** 
MB 2.35 1.72 2.44** 2.64 3.45 -1.81* 2.84 2.94 -1.30 2.61 1.55 1.78* 
 (1.60) (1.30) (1.69)* (2.56) (3.27) (2.25)** (0.69) (1.00) (1.99)** (0.54) (0.30) (2.50)** 
Free Cash Flow -0.05 -0.07 0.82 0.09 0.12 -0.80 -0.07 -0.05 -0.52 -0.17 -0.30 1.68* 
 (0.01) (-0.03) (1.14) (0.10) (015) (0.85) (0.03) (0.03) (1.05) (-0.08) (-0.16) (1.05) 
ROA -0.15 -0.18 1.28 0.04 0.07 -1.06 -0.27 -0.08 -2.01** -0.48 -0.53 1.54 
 (-0.01) (-0.04) (1.25) (0.05) (0.07) (0.25) (-0.03) (-0.02) (1.01) (-0.06) (-0.08) (1.00) 
Insider Ownership 45.89 57.67 -1.99** 42.21 38.45 2.02** 52.40 25.41 2.04** 44.27 58.51 -2.59*** 
 (47.33) (57.15) (2.02)** (38.02) (35.01) (1.35) (17.11) (11.44) (1.98)** (15.24) (19.54) (1.69)* 
Intangibility 0.24 0.38 -2.55** 0.13 0.08 0.53 0.32 0.15 2.35** 0.22 0.22 -1.45 
 (0.07) (0.25) (3.51)*** (0.11) (0.07) (0.23) (0.40) (0.11) (3.85)*** (0.10) (0.20) (3.23)*** 
Size 2.37 2.02 2.51** 3.36 3.78 -1.78* 2.83 2.90 -1.09 2.55 2.29 1.99** 
 (2.40) (2.15) (2.20)** (3.23) (3.88) (2.58)*** (2.79) (3.16) (2.12)** (2.70) (2.45) (2.12)** 
Stock Turnover 0.29 0.11 1.99** 0.98 0.99 -0.14 1.60 1.01 1.95** 0.88 0.75 0.78 
 (0.11) (0.09) (0.84) (0.44) (0.58) (1.68)* (0.19) (0.15) (0.97) (0.22) (0.08) (1.81)* 
Ln(Trade Volume) 2.60 1.89 3.00*** 2.00 3.14 -2.52** 9.26 8.68 2.14** 9.72 9.43 1.41 
 (1.90) (1.00) (1.66)* (1.22) (2.00) (3.00)*** (9.22) (8.86) (1.99)** (9.33) (9.05) (1.58) 
Stock Volatility 0.03 0.04 -1.45 0.02 0.03 -0.50 0.03 0.03 0.54 0.01 0.05 -1.71* 
 (0.02) (0.03) (1.20) (0.02) (0.02) (0.32) (0.03) (0.03) (1.51) (0.02) (0.04) (1.62) 
This table presents means (medians) firms’ characteristics for the delisted firms at the end of the IPO year and the year before delisting. The sample includes 380 companies 
that delisted between 1995 and 2009 including voluntary delisting (155), transferred to the Main market (29), takeovers (81), and delisting due to regulations (115). The 
variables are defined in Table 2. The t-statistics for the differences in means and the MW, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (MW) of the differences in medians, are reported 
in the last column. ***, **,* indicate that the estimate is significant at the 1 %, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 6: Logit Analysis for the Determinants of the Delisting Decision 
 
 Voluntary Delisting Transfers to the Main market Takeovers Delisted due to regulations 
 (1) (2) Marginal 
Effect 
(1) (2) Marginal  
Effect 
(1) (2) Marginal 
Effect 
(1) (2) Marginal  
Effect 
  Panel A. Variables measured at the IPO date  
Leverage 
 
MB 
 
Insider Ownership 
 
ROA 
 
Size 
 
Under-pricing 
 
Dummy. Foreign IPOs 
 
Dummy. VC backing 
 
Dummy. High-tech industries 
 
Dummy. Nomad reputation 
 
C 
 
Nagelkerke R2 
H.L. test 
0.34*** 
(0.005) 
-0.04* 
(0.090) 
0.54 
(0.243) 
0.02 
(0.439) 
-0.15 
(0.961) 
 
 
0.42 
(0.432) 
0.33 
(0.168) 
-0.33 
(0.255) 
-0.37 
(0.395) 
-1.03 
(0.156) 
0.331 
(0.154) 
0.33*** 
(0.007) 
-0.04* 
(0.092) 
0.57 
(0.222) 
0.02 
(0.437) 
-0.20 
(0.946) 
-0.00 
(0.446) 
0.46 
(0.409) 
0.41 
(0.147) 
-0.33 
(0.228) 
-0.33 
(0.410) 
-0.96 
(0.156) 
0.354 
(0.125) 
1.40 
 
0.96 
 
1.72 
 
1.01 
 
1.02 
 
0.99 
 
1.59 
 
1.51 
 
0.71 
 
1.39 
 
0.56 
-0.20 
(0.473) 
0.06 
(0.566) 
-1.93 
(0.234) 
4.30** 
(0.014) 
0.60** 
(0.046) 
 
 
-0.36 
(0.852) 
1.34 
(0.187) 
0.77 
(0.371) 
0.70 
(0.538) 
-1.40*** 
(0.486) 
0.413 
(0.534) 
-0.09 
(0.771) 
0.07 
(0.469) 
-1.94 
(0.240) 
4.37** 
(0.016) 
0.62** 
(0.037) 
-1.03* 
(0.093) 
-0.38 
(0.609) 
1.41 
(0.151) 
-1.52 
(0.445) 
0.35 
(0.227) 
-0.45*** 
(0.002) 
0.426 
(0.112) 
0.91 
 
1.07 
 
0.14 
 
9.61 
 
1.83 
 
0.36 
 
0.68 
 
4.48 
 
2.20 
 
3.58 
 
0.21 
0.03 
(0.548) 
0.87** 
(0.034) 
-0.01* 
(0.100) 
-0.92** 
(0.013) 
-0.19 
(0.403) 
 
 
2.58 
(0.999) 
-0.18 
(0.737) 
-0.60 
(0.346) 
0.19 
(0.715) 
0.39 
(0.685) 
0.514 
(0.723) 
0.01 
(0.686) 
0.82* 
(0.060) 
-0.01 
(0.113) 
-0.93** 
(0.027) 
-0.06 
(0.798) 
0.08 
(0.854) 
2.69 
(0.999) 
-0.10 
(0.863) 
-0.69 
(0.364) 
0.49 
(0.402) 
-0.20 
(0.846) 
0.457 
(0.223) 
2.26 
 
2.27 
 
0.98 
 
0.39 
 
0.93 
 
1.08 
 
0.04 
 
0.89 
 
0.51 
 
1.63 
 
0.87 
0.43** 
(0.010) 
-0.03 
(0.646) 
0.00 
(0.379) 
-0.01 
(0.683) 
-0.14 
(0.386) 
 
 
2.08 
(0.998) 
0.37 
(0.432) 
0.49 
(0.576) 
-1.03** 
(0.019) 
-1.06 
(0.112) 
0.257 
(0.115) 
0.48*** 
(0.019) 
-0.46 
(0.202) 
0.00 
(0.500) 
-0.02 
(0.741) 
-0.47* 
(0.054) 
0.26 
(0.339) 
2.67 
(0.998) 
0.03 
(0.940) 
1.00 
(0.160) 
-0.82* 
(0.082) 
-1.60 
(0.324) 
0.364 
(0.349) 
4.39 
 
0.63 
 
1.01 
 
1.01 
 
0.61 
 
1.30 
 
0.04 
 
1.03 
 
2.72 
 
2.28 
 
0.42 
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Table 6 Cont. Voluntary Delisting Transfers to the Main market Takeovers Delisted due to regulations 
 (1) (2) Marginal  
Effect 
(1) (2) Marginal  
Effect 
(1) (2) Marginal 
Effect 
(1) (2) Marginal  
Effect 
  Panel B. Variables measured one year before delisting  
Leverage 
 
 MB 
 
 ROA 
 
 Insider Ownership 
 
Intangibility  
 
 Size 
 
 Stock Turnover 
 
 Log. Trade Volume 
 
 CAAR[-365,0] 
 
 Stock Volatility 
 
 Beta 
 
 SEO Dummy 
 
 Dummy High-tech 
 
 IPO Life 
 
C 
 
Nagelkerke R2 
H.L. test 
1.59** 
(0.034) 
-0.02** 
(0.048) 
-0.63* 
(0.083) 
0.00** 
(0.020) 
0.37 
(0.355) 
-0.02 
(0.997) 
-0.04 
(0.813) 
 
 
-0.37** 
(0.034) 
-2.94 
(0.552) 
-0.34 
(0.477) 
-0.55* 
(0.060) 
-0.71* 
(0.054) 
0.12* 
(0.062) 
-0.75 
(0.252) 
0.150 
(0.520) 
1.60**  
(0.033) 
-0.01** 
(0.048) 
-0.64* 
(0.081) 
0.00* 
(0.084) 
0.39 
(0.342) 
-0.02 
(0.997) 
 
 
-0.01 
(0.951) 
-0.34** 
(0.040) 
-3.27 
(0.525) 
-0.41 
(0.440) 
-0.55* 
(0.060) 
-0.70* 
(0.054) 
0.11* 
(0.064) 
-0.72 
(0.747) 
0.177 
(0.301) 
4.99 
 
0.98 
 
0.53 
 
0.99 
 
1.45 
 
1.00 
 
 
 
1.00 
 
0.68 
 
0.58 
 
0.04 
 
0.65 
 
0.48 
 
1.12 
 
0.42 
2.02 
(0.993) 
-0.15 
(0.329) 
1.97** 
(0.048) 
-0.01 
(0.258) 
0.46 
(0.668) 
1.29*** 
(0.002) 
0.45* 
(0.065) 
 
 
2.05*** 
(0.001) 
-3.10 
(0.125) 
-2.18** 
(0.049) 
0.23 
(0.774) 
0.885 
(0.220) 
0.03 
(0.845) 
-0.67*** 
(0.000) 
0.513 
(0.969) 
-0.24 
(0.907) 
-0.22 
(0.244) 
4.087** 
(0.023) 
-0.00 
(0.707) 
0.30 
(0.738) 
1.54*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
0.53 
(0.212) 
2.20*** 
(0.001) 
-3.43 
(0.271) 
-2.12** 
(0.062) 
0.04 
(0.752) 
0.23 
(0.754) 
0.13 
(0.421) 
0.37** 
(0.021) 
0.439 
(0.792) 
1.08 
 
0.48 
 
0.10 
 
0.91 
 
0.25 
 
2.05 
 
 
 
0.31 
 
4.66 
 
1.66 
 
1.27 
 
1.52 
 
1.83 
 
0.43 
 
0.01 
-0.82 
(0.994) 
0.04 
(0.568) 
2.13 
(0.451) 
-0.06* 
(0.084) 
-3.34 
(0.521) 
-0.18 
(0.312) 
-0.06 
(0.223) 
 
 
0.79 
(0.995) 
0.01 
(0.218) 
0.12 
(0.521) 
2.54* 
(0.052) 
-0.20 
(0.124) 
-0.10** 
(0.058) 
2.84 
(0.122) 
0.884 
(0.418) 
-0.72  
(0.782) 
0.00 
(0.574) 
1.47 
(0.251) 
-0.03* 
(0.070) 
-1.17 
(0.484) 
-0.42 
(0.314) 
 
 
-0.04 
(0.951) 
0.23 
(0.701) 
0.01 
(0.190) 
.30 
(0.790) 
2.91** 
(0.048) 
-0.28 
(0.154) 
-0.13* 
(0.057) 
1.88 
(0.887) 
0.861 
(0.551) 
2.05 
 
1.00 
 
0.48 
 
0.96 
 
0.30 
 
1.53 
 
 
 
0.96 
 
1.26 
 
0.01 
 
0.73 
 
4.95 
 
0.94 
 
2.01 
 
014 
4.02*** 
(0.002) 
0.02 
(0.295) 
-0.06 
(0.259) 
0.01 
(0.898) 
0.42 
(0.656) 
-0.07** 
(0.015) 
0.10 
(0.765) 
 
 
-0.72 
(0.127) 
3.68 
(0.804) 
1.34 
(0.110) 
-2.11** 
(0.015) 
-2.21** 
(0.046) 
-0.01** 
(0.019) 
-1.38 
(0.251) 
0.541 
(0.889) 
4.34*** 
(0.007) 
0.02 
(0.250) 
-0.06 
(0.291) 
0.05 
(0.425) 
0.70 
(0.478) 
-0.04** 
(0.020) 
 
 
-0.10 
(0.464) 
-0.66 
(0.177) 
3.08 
(0.844) 
1.36 
(0.122) 
-2.33*** 
(0.002) 
-2.14** 
(0.054) 
-0.02** 
(0.021) 
-0.39 
(0.801) 
0.560 
(0.834) 
5.56 
 
0.97 
 
1.06 
 
1.00 
 
2.02 
 
0.96 
 
 
 
0.90 
 
0.51 
 
1.85 
 
0.25 
 
2.37 
 
0.12 
 
0.99 
 
0.67 
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This table presents the results for the logit regression for the factors affecting the delisting decision. Panel A shows the results using the explanatory variables at the exact 
time of the IPO. Panel B presents the results using the explanatory variables at the year prior to the delisting. Panels A and B show the results the logit regression, in which 
the dependent variable is categorises as 0 and 1at the time of the IPO and one year before delisting, respectively. 0 is representing the surviving companies and 1 is for 
delisting companies due to different reasons (voluntary delisting, transferred, takeovers, and regulations). SEO Dummy is a dummy variable equal to one if the company 
raised capital and zero otherwise. Under-pricing is 1st price day minus price offer over price offer. CAAR[-365,0] is cumulated average abnormal returns one year before the 
delisting date. Beta is collected from Bloomberg. Dummy VC backing is a dummy variable set to one for a venture capitalist. Dummy high-tech industry is a dummy variable 
set to one if a firm is in computer manufacturing, electronic equipment, computer and data processing services, and optical, medical, and scientific equipment. Dummy 
Nomad Reputation is a dummy indicating whether the Nomad is among the top 20% advisors ranked according to numbers of IPOs. IPO life controls for the firm’s public 
life. The remaining variables are as defined in Table 2. The Hosmer and Lemeshow (H.L) test shows the goodness-of-fit of the subsequent models. Its significance shows that 
the model does not fit the data. ***, **,* indicate that the estimate is significant at the 1 %, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The p-values are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 7: Cox Proportional Hazard Model for the Delisting Decision 
 Voluntary Delisting Transfers to the Main market Takeovers Delisted due to regulations 
 (1) (2) Hazard Ratio (1) (2) Hazard Ratio (1) (2) Hazard 
Ratio 
(1) (2) Hazard 
Ratio 
Leverage 
 
MB 
 
ROA 
 
Insider Ownership 
 
Intangibility  
 
Size 
 
Stock Turnover 
 
Log. Trade Volume 
 
Stock Volatility 
 
Beta 
 
SEO Dummy 
 
Dummy High-tech 
 
Delisted Firms 
Control Firms 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
0.44** 
(0.048) 
-0.03* 
(0.057) 
-0.06 
(0.218) 
0.01** 
(0.021) 
0.15* 
(0.098) 
-0.11*** 
(0.000) 
-0.03 
(0.789) 
 
 
-0.45 
(0.392) 
-0.25 
(0.655) 
-0.87*** 
(0.000) 
-0.29 
(0.212) 
155 
155 
1645*** 
(0.000) 
0.44** 
(0.039) 
-0.01** 
(0.044) 
-0.06 
(0.179) 
0.01** 
(0.037) 
0.15** 
(0.011) 
-0.19*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
-0.14** 
(0.047) 
-0.58 
(0.336) 
-0.37 
(0.527) 
-0.91*** 
(0.000) 
-0.35 
(0.151) 
155 
155 
1551*** 
(0.000) 
1.552 
 
0.990 
0.935 
 
1.008 
 
1.162 
 
1.006 
 
 
 
0.864 
 
1.308 
 
0.688 
 
0.401 
 
0.702 
 
0.627 
 
-0.98 
(0.550) 
-0.04 
(0.693) 
5.24** 
(0.026) 
-0.01 
(0.424) 
-0.12 
(0.424) 
0.07** 
(0.050) 
0.35* 
(0.056) 
 
 
-0.75 
(0.253) 
-0.58 
(0.381) 
0.20 
(0.715) 
-0.09 
(0.865) 
29 
29 
208*** 
(0.000) 
-0.667 
(0.687) 
-0.02 
(0.889) 
6.20** 
(0.013) 
-0.00 
(0.846) 
-0.69 
(0.200) 
0.11*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
0.32 
(0.196) 
-0.58 
(0.262) 
-0.69 
(0.302) 
0.42 
(0.469) 
-0.14 
(0.802) 
29 
29 
206*** 
(0.000) 
0.513 
 
0.982 
 
3.480 
 
1.003 
 
2.009 
 
1.120 
 
 
 
1.387 
 
1.335 
 
2.456 
 
1.526 
 
0.869 
-1.21** 
(0.014) 
0.03 
(0.959) 
0.27 
(0.177) 
-0.07* 
(0.052) 
-1.00 
(0.127) 
-0.04** 
(0.018) 
0.02 
(0.855) 
 
 
2.57 
(0.383) 
0.67 
(0.221) 
2.90*** 
(0.006) 
-1.10* 
(0.085) 
81 
81 
170*** 
(0.000) 
-1.03** 
(0.025) 
0.03 
(0.975) 
0.35 
(0.213) 
-0.08* 
(0.067) 
-0.93 
(0.365) 
-0.07** 
(0.030) 
 
 
0.04 
(0.758) 
0.74 
(0.506) 
0.57 
(0.311) 
2.90*** 
(0.007) 
-1.05* 
(0.095) 
81 
81 
167*** 
(0.000) 
2.805 
 
1.000 
 
2.668 
 
0.992 
 
0.395 
 
0.933 
 
 
 
1.044 
 
1.031 
 
1.784 
 
1.315 
 
0.534 
 
0.91*** 
(0.004) 
-0.12 
(0.267) 
-0.09* 
(0.063) 
0.00 
(0.830) 
0.74* 
(0.057) 
-0.05* 
(0.067) 
0.02 
(0.610) 
 
 
0.36 
(0.155) 
0.16 
(0.712) 
-0.83** 
(0.021) 
-1.92* 
(0.057) 
115 
115 
658*** 
(0.000) 
0.88*** 
(0.004) 
-0.02 
(0.283) 
-0.08* 
(0.056) 
0.01 
(0.726) 
0.63** 
(0.047) 
-0.08* 
(0.070) 
 
 
-0.04 
(0.582) 
0.13 
(0.233) 
0.20 
(0.635) 
-0.77** 
(0.031) 
-1.86* 
(0.065) 
115 
115 
639*** 
(0.000) 
2.878 
 
0.978 
 
1.008 
 
1.000 
 
1.887 
 
1.018 
 
 
 
1.049 
 
1.201 
 
0.816 
 
2.177 
 
0.155 
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The sample includes all voluntarily delisted firms, transferred to Main market, Takeovers, and Delisted due to regulations in 1995-2009. Variables measured one year before 
delisting. The dependent variable is time to delisting, assuming that there is a probability of delisting every year. SEO Dummy is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
company raised capital and zero otherwise. High-tech dummy is equal to one if a firm is in computer manufacturing, electronic equipment, computer and data processing 
services, and optical, medical, and scientific equipment. The remaining variables are defined in Table 2. The hazard ratios of Model (4.2) in the last column indicate the 
marginal effect of a unit increase in independent variable for continuous explanatory variables and the marginal effect when the event occurs for discrete explanatory 
variables. If the hazard ratio is greater than one the reference category (here 1) has a shorter time to event and if it is equal to one there is no difference between the groups. p-
values are in parentheses. ***, **,* significant at the 1 %, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 8: Leverage and external financing of delisted firms  
 Sample Year 0 Year +1 Year +2 Year +3 Year >3 
Panel A: Voluntary Delisting 
Leverage Delisted   -0.054** 0.004 0.030** 0.002*** 0.016 
  (-2.16) (0.17) (1.78) (2.25) (0.35) 
 Public -4.699* -8.241 -8.131** -11.018 -10.509* 
  (-1.94) (-1.00) (-1.97) (-1.28) (-185) 
Debt Financing Delisted  -2.278 3.462** 1.331* 0.067* 3.018 
  (1.41) (2.05) (1.72) (1.69) (1.13) 
 Public 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 
  (0.20) (-0.25) (-0.37) (0.41) (1.08) 
Equity Financing Delisted  0.004 -0.007 -0.005* -0.009* 0.001 
  (1.49) (-0.68) (-1.78) (-1.69) (0.26) 
 Public 0.020** 0.021** 0.026** 0.013 0.030* 
  (2.18) (2.10) (2.37) (1.58) (1.77) 
ROA Delisted  0.012 -0.234** -0.134 -0.019 -0.100 
  (1.44) (-2.03) (-1.03) (-0147) (-1.59) 
 Public 0.525 3.355* 0.745 1.367 -0.190 
  (0.31) (1.85) (0.36) (0.599) (0.09) 
Panel B: Transfer to Main Market 
Leverage Delisted   -0.038 0.0779 0.046 -0.004 0.102 
  (-0.84) (1.40) (0.72) (-0.09) (0.58) 
 Public -0.202 3.353 -6.370 -4.162 -4.526 
  (-0.00) (0.49) (-0.91) (-0.25) (-0.35) 
Debt Financing Delisted  -0.316 0.350 -0.321 1.060 -3.923 
  (-0.285) (1.46) (-0.183) (0.69) (-1.46) 
 Public 0.001 0.001 0.002* 0.002 0.003 
  (1.40) (1.34) (1.71) (1.41) (1.03) 
Equity Financing Delisted  0.001 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 
  (0.54) (0.41) (-0.21) (-0.43) (0.92) 
 Public 5.120*** 5.110*** 4.960** 5.031** 4.791* 
  (2.83) (2.66) (2.48) (2.39) (1.75) 
ROA Delisted  0.868 -0.830 1.566* 0.778 1.639 
  (0.44) (0.78) (1.77) (1.00) (1.53) 
 Public 1.021 1.082* 1.172* 0.992 -0.092 
  (1.52) (1.93) (1.94) (1.29) (-0.20) 
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Table 8 Cont. Sample Year 0 Year +1 Year +2 Year +3 Year >3 
Panel C: Takeovers 
Leverage Delisted   -0.003 -0.052 -0.018 -0.016 0.451** 
  (-0.01) (-0.22) (-0.08) (-0.07) (2.03) 
 Public -0.092** -0.123*** -0.123*** -0.067 -0.008 
  (-2.07) (-2.91) (-2.93) (-1.60) (-0.24) 
Debt Financing Delisted  -0.449 -0.269 -0.166 -0.093 -0.611** 
  (-1.31) (-0.87) (-0.54) (-0.30) (-2.12) 
 Public -0.133 -0.339 0.048 -0.008 0.101 
  (-0.34) (-0.92) (0.13) (-0.02) (0.32) 
Equity Financing Delisted  0.790 2.245 1.578 1.060 -1.394 
  (0.03) (0.21) (0.17) (0.17) (-1.26) 
 Public 0.748 2.841 -0.661 1.269 -0.845 
  (0.30) (0.09) (-0.35) (0.14) (-0.87) 
ROA Delisted  0.133 0.067 -0.084*** -0.131* 0.141 
  (0.79) (0.44) (-2.56) (-1.86) (0.99) 
 Public 0.437** 0.125 0.248 0.122 0.355** 
  (2.19) (0.66) (1.31) (0.65) (2.20) 
Panel D: Delisted companies due to regulations 
Leverage Delisted   -0.113** -0.147*** 0.086* 0.030 0.001 
  (-2.45) (-3.22) (1.84) (0.62) (0.03) 
 Public -0.032 -0.056* -0.016* 0.014 -0.016 
  (-1.07) (-1.93) (-1.57) (0.50) (-0.65) 
Debt Financing Delisted  -0.185 -0.253 -0.275 -0.193 -0.083 
  (-0.90) (-1.26) (-1.35) (-0.92) (-0.43) 
 Public -0.338 0.680 -0.104 -0.036 0.079 
  (-0.66) (1.37) (-0.21) (-0.07) (0.19) 
Equity Financing Delisted  0.925 0.959 0.638 0.594 0.881 
  (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (1.52) 
 Public 0.557 -0.297 0.226 0.804 -0.362 
  (0.45) (-0.47) (0.07) (0.20) (-0.66) 
ROA Delisted  -0.453 -0.283 -0.028** 0.014 -0.542* 
  (-0.17) (-0.11) (-2.01) (-0.01) (-1.73) 
 Public -0.043 0.087 0.686** 0.155** -0.042 
  (-0.14) (0.28) (2.21) (2.50) (-0.16) 
The table presents the results of 
Here ui, and dt are firm specific and 
calendar year specific effects. IPOt-j are dummy variables equal to one if year t-j was the IPO 
year, IPOt-n is a dummy variable set to one if the IPO took place more than 3 years before. 
The table reports the coefficients on the IPO and the post IPO periods. Y refers to leverage, 
debt financing, and equity financing. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets. Debt 
financing is debt issued divided by total capital employed. Equity Financing is equity issued 
divided by total capital employed. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The last 
column reports the p-value of f-test of the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of all 
the post-IPO dummies is equal to zero. ***, **,* indicate that the estimate is significant at the 1 
%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 9: Market Reaction to the Delisting Announcement 
 Delisting Method 
 Voluntary Transfer Takeovers Legislation 
Panel A. Excess Returns Around Announcement Dates 
N 
CAR -360,-2 
P-value (Z-test) 
%Positive 
 
CAR -20,-2 
P-value (Z-test) 
%Positive 
 
CAR -5,+5 
P-value (Z-test) 
%Positive 
 
CAR -1,+1 
P-value (Z-test) 
%Positive 
 
CAR 0,+1 
P-value (Z-test) 
%Positive 
 
CAR +2,+20 
P-value (Z-test) 
%Positive 
153 
-1.57% 
(0.045)** 
45.22 
 
-2.69% 
(0.231) 
45.1 
 
-10.05% 
(0.000)*** 
43.14 
 
-7.39% 
(0.000)*** 
47.06 
 
-8.32% 
(0.000)*** 
47.06 
 
-1.93% 
(0.664) 
32.03 
27 
13.77% 
(0.001)*** 
51.85 
 
1.59% 
(0.474) 
43.35 
 
0.50% 
(0.704) 
40.74 
 
0.59% 
(0.506) 
48.15 
 
0.37% 
(0.572) 
37.04 
 
1.67% 
(0.267) 
43.75 
75 
4.95% 
(0.526) 
42.67 
 
-9.48% 
(0.002)*** 
32 
 
-4.58% 
(0.020)** 
33.33 
 
-0.90% 
(0.445) 
46.67 
 
-0.71% 
(0.452) 
46.67 
 
-9.60% 
(0.007)*** 
34.67 
115 
-6.19% 
(0.000)*** 
23.48 
 
-3.32% 
(0.221) 
34.35 
 
-1.17% 
(0.570) 
37.04 
 
-0.27% 
(0.834) 
37.91 
 
-0.61% 
(0.499) 
37.91 
 
-4.95% 
(0.037)** 
69.57 
Panel B. Panel B. CAR-1, +1 of voluntary delisted firms split into changes in leverage 
 N CAR-1, +1 P-value (Z-test) %Positive
Voluntary delisting - increase leverage 
Voluntary delisting - decrease leverage 
Increase – Decrease leverage 
40 
80 
-10.57% 
-4.77% 
(0.020)** 
(0.018)** 
(0.045)** 
47.76 
35.29 
The abnormal returns are based on the market model with the coefficients α and β computed 
over the -257 to -21 days relative to the announcement date of the delisting. The FTSE AIM 
share index is used as a proxy for the market return. The sample excludes 2 voluntary 
delisting firms, 2 firms that transferred to the Main market, 6 takeovers because their stock 
price data was not available on DataStream. ***, **,* indicate that the estimate is significant at 
the 1 %, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Figure 1: Non-Financial IPOs and Non-Financial Delisted Companies 
 
This graph shows the annual distribution of the number of listed and delisted of IPO 
companies in AIM during the sample period (1995-2012). The sample excludes financial 
companies because of their specific characteristics. IPOs are the newly listed firms. Delisted 
are firms that went out of the AIM market through voluntarily, Transferred to Main, 
Takeovers, and Market regulations reasons. Net New Companies is the difference between the 
number of IPOs and the Number of delisted companies. 
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Figure 2: Delisting Reasons 
 
 
This figure shows the proportion of reasons for delisting on AIM. The sample includes non-
financial firms. The data is extracted from the AIM statistics provided by the London Stock 
Exchange over the period 1995 to 2009. 
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Figure 3: Trend in Firms’ Characteristics in Post-IPO Period 
Panel A. Leverage    Panel B. Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
 
Panel C. ROA    Panel D. Size as measured by Log of  
market value of equity 
 
The sample includes 158 firms that delisted voluntarily (Going Private IPO) and 26 firms 
that transferred from AIM to the Main market (Transferred IPO). The Remained Public 
Companies are the control firms based on the IPO date and size as measured by market value 
of equity at the IPO date. The sample period spans from 1995 to 2009. The data for the IPO 
date is extracted from the prospectuses and the market value of the firm used in Panel B. and 
Panel D. Is based on the issue price times the number of shares issued. In year 1 and year 2 
after the IPO, the data is extracted from DataStream. In Panel A. Leverage is total debt 
divided over total assets. In Panel C. ROA is the ratio of earnings before interests and taxes 
over total assets.  
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